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Abstract 
The ratio of capital expenditure to total assets of U.S. firms decreases by more than half from 1980 to 
2012. The decline is pervasive; it has occurred for firms in most industries and is robust to firms of 
different size, investment opportunity, profitability, access to external financing, and expense on R&D 
or acquisitions. The decline is not explained by time variation in firm characteristics, corporate 
lifecycle, or public listing cohorts. Our further evidence suggests that it is related to the transition of 
U.S. economic structure, the increasing importance of intangible capital in firm production, and the 
globalization of the world economy in the past decades. Firms react by investing less in fixed assets 
and more in intangible assets. International evidence shows that countries with similar levels of 
economic development to the U.S. (G7 and OECD countries) have also incurred significant declines 
in capital investment while emerging economies such as BRICS have not.  
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1. Introduction 
Capital investment is a necessary input of a firm’s production process and a critical factor for the 
firm to survive and grow. At the macro level, it is also a fundamental driver of economic growth. In 
this paper, we document a persistent decline in capital investment of U.S. public firms in the period of 
1980-2012. For example, the median firm’s capital expenditure relative to its total assets drops from 
7.80% in 1980 to 3.14% in 2012 – a cut by more than half. In a regression of this ratio on a constant 
and a time variable, the time variable has a negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate. 
Our further analysis suggests that the decline is pervasive; it has occurred in varying degrees for firms 
of almost all industries and is robust to firms of different asset size, investment opportunity, 
profitability, access to external financing, and whether or not expense on R&D or acquisitions.  
Why do U.S. firms invest less and less over time? The neoclassical economic theories suggest 
that a firm’s optimal investment is solely determined by its investment opportunities. In a frictionless 
capital market, a firm should invest whenever a profitable investment opportunity arises. By taking all 
positive net-present-value (NPV) projects, the firm maximizes its value. However, imperfect market 
conditions, due to taxes, adjustment costs, information asymmetry, and interest conflicts among 
stakeholders, etc., often lead to suboptimal investment. For example, firms may not be able to invest 
in a positive NPV project when they are financially constrained. Firms may delay investment when 
the adjustment costs are high. Managers may underinvest to maximize shareholders’ interest instead 
of maximizing the overall firm value or overinvest for their own interest at the expense of 
shareholders.  
Empirically, a firm’s capital investment has been shown to be positively related to its investment 
opportunities and cash flows, and negatively related to firm size in the cross-section. The positive 
relation between investment and investment opportunity is obvious. There are, however, at least three 
different reasons for firms with high cash flows to invest more. A high cash flow could signal more 
profitable investment opportunities, a relaxation of financial constraint, or an aggravation of agency 
problems; all of them predict more investment. The negative relation between investment and firm 
size is largely mechanical since investment is deflated by firm size. It is also consistent with the 
diminishing marginal return of investment. 
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We examine if the decline in capital investment is explained by these firm characteristics. Do 
U.S. firms’ investment opportunities, or cash flows, also decline persistently during our sample period?  
Alternatively, is the investment decline concentrated in firms of certain characteristics? While we 
confirm the cross-sectional relations between these characteristics and corporate investment, our 
empirical analysis suggests that changes in these firm characteristics have limited power in explaining 
the time-series investment decline. First, we do not find that firm characteristics vary over time to the 
extent that U.S. firms have experienced diminishing investment opportunities or tightening financial 
constraints. Investment opportunity, measured by the market-to-book ratio of assets, generally 
improves during our sample period. The median ratio of cash flow to assets is roughly flat over the 
same period. Second, we divide firms each year into two groups based on the median asset size, 
market-to-book ratio of assets, sales growth, cash flow to assets, leverage, whether or not firms pay 
dividends, have (investment-grade) bond ratings, or spend on R&D or acquisitions, and find 
significant investment declines in all groups. Third, in regressions of investment that control for (the 
time-series and cross-sectional variations of) these characteristics, we still observe a significantly 
negative time trend in investment.  
We rule out several other potential explanations. First, the investment decline is not explained by 
the change of firm composition over time. Firms listed in different decades often exhibit different 
features such as tendency to pay dividends and issue long-term debt (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; 
Custodio, Ferreira, and Laureano, 2013). However, we find that the investment decline is robust to the 
control of the fixed effects of public listing cohorts. Firms of different listing cohorts do not seem to 
have different levels of investment after controlling for firm characteristics and industry fixed effects. 
Second, corporate lifecycle does not appear to explain the investment decline either. We show that 
while firms invest a lot immediately after incorporation and reduce investment afterward, the 
reduction in investment does not persist after five years of incorporation. Moreover, U.S. firms are not 
getting older on average as many new firms are founded and get listed. The investment decline is 
therefore not consistent with the corporate lifecycle explanation which suggests that maturing U.S. 
firms experience diminishing investment opportunities and consequently cut their investment. Third, 
the price of investment goods, especially equipment and software, reduces as technology advances 
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(Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell, 1997, Cummins and Violante, 2002). We find that, while the 
price reduction plays a non-negligible role, it leaves the dominant part of the investment decline 
unexplained.  
Our further analysis suggests that the investment decline is related to the structural change of the 
U.S. economy in the past decades, that is, the services-producing sector substantially grows relative to 
the goods-producing sector (e.g., Lee and Wolpin, 2006; Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel, 2009; Corrado 
and Hulten, 2010; Buera and Kaboski, 2012). Moreover, recent studies also suggest the increasing 
importance of intangible capital in firm production (e.g., Lustig, Syverson, and Van Nieuwerburgh, 
2011; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013; 2014). Both the transition of economic structure and the 
change in production technology lead to corporate investing less in fixed assets and more in human 
capital and other intangible assets. Our examination on the assets structure confirms this hypothesis. 
Fixed assets as a proportion of total assets reduce significantly over time; on the other hand, intangible 
assets increase its share in the assets structure.  
Moreover, we find a persistent and significant reduction in the sensitivity of corporate capital 
expenditure to investment opportunities. A new investment opportunity in the more recent years, 
relative to that in the earlier years, demands firms to invest less in fixed assets and more in intangible 
assets. In other words, as production technology changes, fixed assets investment becomes less 
important in firm production. Instead, the accumulation of intangible capital and the resulted 
innovation in product development, design, and marketing become more and more important in 
improving productivity.  
Our industry-level analysis shows that, although most industries experience investment declines, 
the expanding industries incur significantly larger declines than the shrinking industries. In addition, 
industries that reduce the use of materials input (relative to purchased services) most incur the largest 
reduction in capital expenditure, consistent with the change in production technology. 
The globalization of the world economy in the past decades facilitates the economic structure 
change and lead to the investment decline in the U.S. and other developed economies. We find an 
increasing proportion of sales by foreign firms over our sample period, and industries with greater 
increases in the foreign sales reduce capital investment by more. Using international data, we show 
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that firms in developed economies such as G7 and OECD countries incur investment declines similar 
to U.S. firms. In contrast, firms in the fast-growing economies such as BRICS have not reduced 
investment. This is consistent with the hypothesis that more developed economies have been 
transforming their economic structure towards more services productions. As a result, much of the 
production in industries with traditionally heavy capital expenditure is shifting to less developed 
economies with relatively cheaper labor. 
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we are the first to examine capital 
investment of U.S. firms in a long horizon and identify a robust and pervasive, and somewhat 
puzzling, decline over the last three decades. Existing theories of investment, due to their micro 
perspective, fall short in explaining the decline trend. We show that it is associated with the transition 
of U.S. economic structure, globalization, and the change in production technology. Corporate 
investment adjusts to the gradual shift in technology and economic environment. Second, we 
document a significant reduction in the sensitivity of capital expenditure to firm investment 
opportunity. It calls for a dynamic view on corporate investment behavior and its determinants. The 
advance in production technology suggests a much broader definition of corporate investment. This 
has important implications even for asset pricing theories based on corporate investment.    
Third, we add to the burgeoning literature on the role of intangible capital in firm production and 
asset pricing (e.g., Lev, 2001; Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005; Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005; Faria, 2008; 
Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel, 2009; Corrado and Hulten, 2010; Carlin, Chowdhry, and Garmaise, 2011; 
Lustig, Syverson, and Van Nieuwerburgh, 2011; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013 and 2014). 
Intangible capital plays an increasingly important role in firm production and reduces the reliance of 
firm growth on fixed assets. Our finding, based on firm and industry level data, is consistent with the 
aggregate evidence in Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) and Corrado and Hulten (2010) of the shift 
in the composition of investment from physical capital towards intangible capital in the U.S. since 
1970s. Our study also lend support to the recent development in the economic growth literature – a 
change from the traditional theory that relies on the production function as the analytical framework 
(which is based on standard inputs like physical capital) to a new strand of empirical approaches that 
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incorporate corporate investment in intangibles (see Corrado and Hulten (2010) for a reference of the 
new economic growth literature).     
Lastly, our finding sheds light on some recent findings about corporate decisions. For instance, 
Chen and Chen (2012) find a steady decline in investment-cash-flow sensitivity. . Our finding 
suggests that the declining importance of physical capital in firm production could play a role in this 
phenomenon. Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) document an increasing trend of cash holding by U.S. 
firms over the broadly same sample period. Our study suggests that both the decline in capital 
investment and the increase in cash holding are consistent with the structural change of the U.S. 
economy and the increasing intangibility of U.S. firm assets. Falato, Kadyrzhanove, and Sim (2014) 
suggest that the shrinking debt capacity due to the increase in asset intangibility leads firms to 
optimally hold more cash.        
The rest of our study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the evidence of the time-series 
decline in corporate investment. Section 3 reviews the theory and empirical literature of corporate 
investment. Section 4 investigates whether firm characteristics explain the time-series decline in 
investment. Section 5 explores implications of the economic structure transition and the production 
technology change on capital investment. Section 6 investigates the impact of globalization and 
international evidence. Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The time series evidence of corporate capital expenditure 
Our sample consists of U.S. firms with common stocks traded at the NYSE, AMEX, or 
NASDAQ during the period of 1980-2012. Utilities (Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes 
between 4900 and 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are excluded 
because of regulations of their corporate policies. We require the information of firm total assets (A) 
and capital expenditure (CAPX) available in the Compustat fundamental annual file. Our base sample 
consists of 13,386 unique firms with 111,965 firm-year observations. 
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Our primary variable of capital investment is a firm’s annual capital expenditure divided by its 
total assets at the end of the previous fiscal year (CAPX/A).
2
 Table 1 presents the median, mean, and 
aggregate ratios of capital expenditure to assets from 1980 to 2012, which are also plotted in Figure 1 
for a more intuitive view. The aggregate ratio is calculated as the sum of dollar capital expenditure 
across all firms in a given year divided by the sum of these firms’ total assets at the previous fiscal 
year end. All three ratios in Figure 1 decline substantially even though there are some minor reversals 
in the middle 1990s and several years before the 2008 financial crisis. Like many other corporate 
financial ratios, the capital investment ratio is positively skewed – the mean tends to be higher than 
the median. The number of firms in our sample starts with 3,111 in 1980, peaks at 4,945 in 1997, and 
declines to 2,643 in 2012, exhibiting an inverse U-shape.  
Next we employ the Dicker-Fuller test to examine the time trend formally. We run the following 
time-series regression,   
∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡+1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝛾 ∗ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡
+ 𝜃1 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡
 
+𝜃2 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−1
+ 𝜃3 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−2
+ 𝜃4 ∗ ∆(
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−3
+ 𝜀.   (1) 
The dependent variable is the difference in the capital expenditure ratios between the two subsequent 
years, t+1 and t. The explanatory variables on the right-hand side include a time variable of fiscal year 
(Trend), the level of capital expenditure in fiscal year t, and four lagged changes in capital 
expenditure.
3
 The coefficient on Trend,  𝛽, captures the time trend of CAPX/A. Regression results are 
reported in Table 2, in three columns respectively corresponding to the median, mean, and aggregate 
ratios of capital expenditure. Confirming a decreasing time trend, the coefficient estimates of Trend in 
all three regressions are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. The economic magnitude 
is substantial and fairly consistent across different measures. The ratio of corporate investment to 
                                                          
2
 Capital expenditure in Compustat is a consolidated figure. It includes capital expenditure made by U.S. firms’ 
overseas subsidiaries, for example, P&G’s investment in their Indian division. The same is for total assets. 
Capital expenditure also includes costs of capital leases. While operating lease is not accounted in capital 
expenditure (it is often accounted as operating expenses in income statement), it does not affect the denominator, 
total assets, either.  
3
 Our empirical results are robust to controls of one to four lags of capital expenditure changes. 
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assets decreases by 0.070%, 0.137%, or 0.149% per year during the 33 years of our sample, 
respectively, for the median, mean, and aggregate ratios.  
Our main sample consists of U.S. public firms traded at the three major stock exchanges. It is 
interesting to know whether the decline is subsumed if we include investment made by private firms. 
We examine this possibility using data from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). BEA collects 
private non-residential fixed investment (PNFI) data, which contains annual investment in fixed assets 
by both private and public corporations. We compare the average ratio of PNFI relative to fixed assets 
of all firms with that of public corporations, and find they are very close in magnitude and both 
experience a similar decline in our sample period. We therefore rule out the possibility that including 
investment of private firms would change our results.
4
 
Technological improvement in the post-war period has been remarkable. Technological advances 
have made corporate investment-specific equipment less expensive in general (Gordon, 1990; 
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell, 1997, Cummins and Violante, 2002). One potential implication 
is that our finding of the decline in dollar amount of capital expenditure could be a result of cheaper 
investment goods. To control the impact of the decreasing price of investment goods, we adjust the 
numerator of our CAPX/A ratio by a price index of investment goods, which was originally 
constructed in Gordon (1990).
5
 We report the adjusted CAPX/A ratios in the last three columns of 
Table 1 and also plot them in Figure 2 in comparison with the raw time series. Reduced price of 
investment goods indeed accounts for part of the decline in capital expenditure. For example, 
comparing the median CAPX/A in 2012 to that of 1980, the drop is about 60% before the price 
adjustment while the drop reduces to 48% after the adjustment. The effect of adjustment is similar for 
the other two ratios of CAPX/A as reported in the last row of Table 1. We therefore conclude that the 
decreasing price of investment goods has a significant impact on the magnitude of the investment 
decline but it does not completely explain the time-series decline.  
                                                          
4
 The graph of PNFI/Fixed Assets based on the BEA data is available upon request from the authors. 
5
 The price index of investment goods is originally constructed in Gordon (1990) for the period of 1947-1983, 
extended to 2000 in Cummins and Violante (2002), and extended further to 2013 by Riccardo DiCecio for his 
work (2009). We appreciate Riccardo DiCecio for kindly sharing his data with us. 
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Next we investigate if the finding of investment decline is concentrated in certain industries. We 
perform the regressions in equation (1) at the industry level, where the sample is classified into 44 
Fama and French (1997) industries.
6
 In Table 3, we report the estimates of 𝛽 and the associated t-
statistics for each industry. Based on the industry median CAPX/A, out of 44 industries in total, 41 
industries (93.2%) show a declining trend in capital expenditure and in 30 of them (68.2%), the 
declining trend is statistically significant. Only three industries (coal; petroleum and natural gas; 
fabricated products) yield a positive 𝛽 for the time variable but none of them is statistically significant. 
The examination on the industry mean ratio shows that the decline occurs to 43 industries and is 
statistically significant in 35 of them. The results based on the industry aggregate CAPX/A are very 
similar –declines are observed for 42 industries and 33 of them are statistically significant. The 
evidence suggests that the decline in investment is pervasive; in the meantime, we observe substantial 
variations in the decline magnitude across industries.   
 
3. What determines corporate investment? 
In this section, we review the literature of corporate investment. Assuming firm value 
maximization, the neoclassical theory of investment (Keynes, 1936; Jorgenson, 1963; 1967) suggests 
that a firm’s optimal investment is made until the present value of expected future cash flows, at the 
margin, equals the opportunity cost of capital. Accounting for the adjustment cost of capital, Brainard 
and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969) develop the neoclassical theory to the q-theory of investment. The 
q-theory predicts that investment is a positive function of the ratio of the capital shadow price to its 
replacement cost and the optimal amount of investment is made until the ratio equals 1. The ratio is 
thereafter referred to as marginal q or Tobin’s q. Tobin’s q, often measured empirically as the market-
to-book ratio of assets, has become a very popular measure of investment opportunities.
7
 Empirical 
                                                          
6
 The Fama-French scheme classifies firms into 49 industries, but five industries including utilities, banking, 
insurance, real estate, and trading are excluded in our sample. 
7
 In theory, investment should be made until the marginal q equals one, where marginal q is the marginal return 
on capital relative to the cost of capital. The market-to-book ratio of assets is a measure of average return on 
capital. Hayashi (1982) however shows that average q equals marginal q when the firm is in a competitive 
market and its production function is homogenous.  
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studies confirm a positive relation between capital investment and Tobin’s q – firms invest more if 
they have more investment opportunities.  
In the q-theory, Tobin’s q is a sufficient statistic for investment. However, studies find that 
investment is also positively related to the firm’s cash flow, even if q is included as an explanatory 
variable.
8
 Cash flow is measured as the sum of earnings and depreciation. The interpretation of this 
finding is however controversial. Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), for example, interpret it as 
evidence of financing constraint affecting corporate investment. As a result of an imperfect capital 
market, due to all sorts of market frictions, external financing such as equity and debt is often more 
expensive than internal funds. Some firms are restricted of the access to the external financing market. 
These financially constrained firms tend to investment more when they generate more cash flow, 
generating high investment-cash flow sensitivity. The critics point out the endogeneity problem, 
namely, a firm’s cash flow may contain information about its investment opportunities that, due to 
measurement errors, Tobin’s q fails to capture. 9  
Capital market imperfections also lead to leverage being related to investment. Myers (1977) 
describes a debt overhang problem, in which a firm may under invest relative to the optimal amount 
when its debt level is high. This is because interest conflicts between equity and debt holders 
discourage decision-making equity holders from investing on even positive NPV projects if the 
benefits of investment mainly go to debt holders. It predicts a negative relation between investment 
and leverage – high leverage and financial distress result in underinvestment.  
The agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, on the other hand, predict 
overinvestment. Jensen (1986; 1993), for example, argues that managers’ empire-building preferences 
will cause them to invest excessively and abundant internal fund exacerbates the problem (i.e., free 
cash flow problem).  This leads to the prediction that investment is increasing in internal fund. Jensen 
                                                          
8
 Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991), Whited (1992), among others. 
Hubbard (1998) provides a comprehensive review of the literature. 
9
 This interpretation is controversial, for example, Gomes (2001), Alti (2003), Cooper and Ejarque (2003), and 
Abel and Eberly (2011) theoretically demonstrate the positive relation between investment and cash flow in the 
absence of financing constraints. Hennessy, Levy, Whited (2007) show that the convex costs of external equity 
may lead to the positive relation between investment and cash flow. Kaplan and Zingales (1997) empirically 
challenge the positive relation between investment and cash flow as evidence of financial constraint. Erickson 
and Whited (2000) suggest that errors in measuring marginal q result in the positive relation between investment 
and cash flow. 
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suggests firms using debt to control the problem, because debt services make the firm obligated to pay 
out cash and thereby reduce managers’ discretionary budgets. This also implies that investment 
decreases with leverage. Other managerial characteristics might also affect firm investment, such as 
short-termism, herding tendency, inertia, and overconfidence.
10
   
Studies also suggest that, if the stock market is not perfectly efficient, mispricing could also 
affect corporate investment. For example, Stein (1996) hypothesizes that the investment of firms that 
are heavily dependent on external equity is more sensitive to stock mispricing than firms with plenty 
of cash. In particular, the equity-dependent firms tend to issue equity and invest more when their 
stock prices are (overly) high. Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) provide evidence supportive of this 
prediction, as well as similarly in Polk and Sapienza (2009). This predicts a positive relation between 
investment and stock valuation (return). However, it is worth mentioning that high stock return or 
valuation may suggest anticipation of positive investment opportunities.  
Corporate investment is also affected by macroeconomic factors. Bernanke and Gertler (1989) 
suggest that a positive shock to the economy improves firms’ profits and retained earnings; this in 
turn leads to increased investment and output. The mechanism amplifies the upturn. Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997) further argue that this kind of acceleration effect could also function through the 
movement in firms’ asset values, in addition to just cash flows.  Corporate investment is also affected 
by the easiness of the credit market, which is a function of the central bank monetary policy and the 
banking industry performance. Firms invest more when they are easy to borrow capital in the market. 
Bernanke and Gertler (1995) provide a survey for the literature. Recent studies show that a country’s 
financial development, at least partly driven by the country’s legal protection and accounting 
standards, is a strong predictor of its growth, capital accumulation and investment (King and Levine, 
1993; LaPorta et al., 1997; 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). 
Financial development protects investors better and thus relaxes external financing constraint.   
                                                          
10
 See Stein (2003) for a survey of the literature. These managerial characteristics predict either over or under 
investment. For example, inertia predicts managers prefer “a quiet life”, so they don’t invest when good 
investment opportunities arise and are reluctant to liquidate poor projects that are already invested. The 
empirical support for these hypotheses is mostly in the cross-section. For the interest of our paper, we assume 
that these managerial characteristics are more or less stable over time and unlikely to lead to the secular decline 
in firm investment.  
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In summary, corporate investment is positively related to Tobin’s q, cash flow, stock return 
(valuation), and negatively related to leverage. In addition to these firm-level factors, it is also 
affected by the general market environment, such as business-cycle fluctuations, productivity 
(technology) shocks, credit easiness in the market, and the institutional development of the financial 
market. 
 
4. Firm characteristics and the decline in corporate investment 
In this section, we explore the relation between corporate investment and various firm 
characteristics, as motivated by existing theories of investment. We then investigate if the time-series 
decline in investment is explained by the time-series variation in firm characteristics, or concentrated 
in (driven by) firms of certain characteristics. We employ both univariate analysis and multiple 
regressions.   
4.1. Univariate Analysis 
4.1.1. Investment opportunity 
Investment opportunity is perhaps the most important determinant of corporate investment. The 
q-theory predicts that a firm should invest until the marginal benefit of investment equals its 
replacement cost. Investment opportunity is thus measured by the marginal q in theory. Firms should 
invest more if their marginal q is higher in the cross-section. Empirically a firm’s marginal q is often 
measured by its market-to-book ratio of assets. We compute the ratio as (book value of total assets – 
book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets. As an alternative, we also 
measure investment opportunity by sales growth – the percentage change in sales from the previous 
fiscal year. If the time-series decline in investment is driven by investment opportunity, we expect to 
observe: (1) The average and aggregate investment opportunities of U.S. firms shrink over time; and 
(2) the decline is more evident in firms with fewer investment opportunities.  
To investigate if investment opportunities of U.S. firms decrease over time, we compute the 
median and mean market-to-book asset ratio (V/A) of a given year and plot them in a panel of Figure 
3. We find that, on average, investment opportunities slightly increase during our sample period. In 
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unreported time-series regressions, we confirm the increasing trend in V/A. This evidence challenges 
shrinking investment opportunity as a potential reason for the decline in investment.  
To examine the investment trend across firms of different investment opportunities, we cut the 
sample each year into two subsamples of high and low investment opportunities, based on the median 
market-to-book ratio of assets (or sales growth) in that year. Table 4 presents the averages of the 
median CAPX/A ratio for the high and low investment opportunity subsamples during the 5-year 
subperiods (the initial and final subperiods have 7 and 8 years) and the full period. Consistent with the 
q-theory, firms with more investment opportunities invest more in the cross-section. The CAPX/A 
ratio is higher for the subsample of firms with higher market-to-book asset ratios or sales growth. 
Comparing across the subperiods, we find that CAPX/A decreases significantly in both high and low 
investment opportunity subsamples. The last two columns of this table report the coefficient estimates 
of the trend variable and the associated p-value using the model specification (1). However, the 
magnitude of decline is about three times larger for firms with more investment opportunities. In other 
words, the decline in investment is more evident in firms with more investment opportunities. It is 
somewhat surprising that firms with relatively more investment opportunities do not keep up their 
capital expenditure as suggested by their investment opportunities.
11
 The results also cast doubt on 
time variation in investment opportunity as an explanation for the time-series decline in investment.  
4.1.2. Financial constraint 
Studies have shown that, controlling for investment opportunities, a firm’s capital investment is 
also positively related to its cash flow. One interpretation for the positive cash flow-investment 
sensitivity is financial constraint. Asymmetric information implies a higher cost of external capital 
than internal funds, resulting in financial constraint for some firms that are more dependent on 
external financing. These constrained firms increase investment when they realize a higher cash flow. 
Our univariate analysis reported in Table 4 seems consistent with the effect of financial constraint on 
investment. The literature generally suggests that large firms, firms producing high cash flows, firms 
with high cash payout, and firms with (investment-grade) credit ratings are less subject to the adverse 
selection problem and thus are less financially constrained. We find that these firms tend to invest 
                                                          
11
 We revisit this issue in Sections 5. 
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more than their counterparts in the cross-section, as shown in Table 4. Over time, both groups of firms 
incur significant time-series declines in capital investment. More interestingly, the magnitudes of 
declines are not consistent under the different proxies of financial constraint. We find that small firms, 
firms with high cash flow, low payout, and good credit ratings tend to reduce investment by more. 
The evidence thus does not support financial constraint as a potential explanation for the time-series 
decline in investment.  
4.1.3. Agency problems 
Agency problems predict a positive relation between internal funds and investment since 
overinvestment is more likely when internal funds are abundant. Leverage, as a way to leash 
overinvestment, is expected to be negatively related to investment. Moreover, high leverage may lead 
to debt overhang and underinvestment, which reinforces the negative relation. Our univariate analysis 
in the whole sample, however, generates little evidence for a positive relation between cash holding 
and investment or a negative relation between leverage and investment. But if we take a closer look at 
different times, it is true that, in the early periods, high cash holding and low leverage are associated 
with large corporate investment. This cross-sectional evidence seems to reverse in the later periods. 
Our trend analysis in subsamples confirms a larger time-series investment decline for firms with high 
cash holding or low leverage. Since agency problems, if any, are supposed to be worse in these firms, 
the evidence of larger investment declines does not seem to be explained by agency concern. 
Moreover, if low internal fund and high leverage also characterize financial constraint, the larger 
investment declines for firms that are not financially constrained are inconsistent with tightening 
financial constraint over time.    
4.1.4. Capital productivity 
In a conventional production function such as the Cobb-Douglas function, economic output is a 
function of labor and capital inputs. The parameters reflect technology and the relative importance of 
the inputs. If a firm’s production is labor intensive, it relies less on capital investment. For a given 
amount of output, its average capital productivity, measured by sales divided by PP&E (i.e., plants, 
property, and equipment), is usually higher. On the other hand, a firm with capital intensive 
production generally has lower average capital productivity. In other words, average capital 
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productivity often signals the importance of capital investment in a firm’s production. Our univariate 
analysis confirms that firms with lower capital productivity tend to invest more than firms with higher 
capital productivity in the cross-section. In the time-series, we find that firms with both high and low 
capital productivities experience significant declines in capital investment. If any, the magnitude of 
decline is larger for capital-intensive firms.  
4.1.5. R&D and acquisitions as substitutes 
In a broader sense, corporate investment could also include expenses on research and 
development (R&D) and acquisitions. In accounting, capital expenditure (CAPX) increases a firm’s 
fixed assets (i.e., plants, property, and equipment), while R&D increases a firm’s expected intangible 
assets. Depending on the nature of the target firm and the accounting method (pooling vs. purchasing), 
an acquisition could increase both tangible and intangible assets. It is a natural conjecture whether 
there is a substitution between capital expenditure and R&D as well as acquisition expenses.  
We investigate this conjecture as follows.  We divide the sample into two groups depending on if 
a firm has incurred any R&D expenses during our sample period 1980-2012. So the non-R&D group 
consists of firms that have never reported any R&D expenses in the four decades. Similarly we divide 
firms into the acquirer and non-acquirer groups.
12
 Table 4 presents the median CAPX/A ratios for 
each group in each subperiod, as well as for the whole period. The time-series decline in investment is 
statistically significant for firms in both the non-acquirer and non-R&D groups, though the magnitude 
is larger for the acquirer and R&D groups. The evidence suggests that the substitution story, at best, 
provides a partial explanation for the investment decline and is limited in certain firms.  
In short, the univariate analysis largely confirms the cross-sectional relations between corporate 
investment and various firm characteristics. However, none of these factors fully explains the time-
series decline in investment. The decline occurs in firms with both high and low investment 
opportunities, in both large and small firms, in firms that seem financially constrained or not 
seemingly constrained, in firms with both high and low cash holdings, in firms regardless of whether 
expense on R&D and acquisitions.  
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 In our sample during 1980-2012, 49.70% of the firms have not reported any R&D expenses and 40.20% of 
the firms have not reported any acquisition expenses.  
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4.2.  Multiple regressions 
Next we investigate the relation between capital investment and various firm characteristics in 
multiple regressions. The purpose is to analyze if the investment decline can be attributed to time-
series changes in firm characteristics. This method has been used in Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009) in 
examining time-series changes in corporate cash holding and Custodio, Ferreira, and Laureano (2013) 
in examining time-series changes in corporate debt maturity. Our dependent variable, CAPX/A, is 
each firm’s capital expenditure deflated by its total assets in the previous year. The independent 
variables in our basic regressions, motivated by existing theories and empirical evidence of corporate 
investment, include investment opportunity measured by the market-to-book asset ratio, cash flow 
relative to its assets, and firm size measured as the natural log of total assets. All explanatory variables 
are lagged by a fiscal year. Table 5 reports the regression results. Results from the first model confirm 
the findings of earlier studies that capital investment is positively related to investment opportunity 
and cash flow and negatively related to firm size.  
In the second model, we include in the baseline model a set of dummy variables corresponding to 
the five-year subperiods. For example, the 1985-1989 dummy equals one if the dependent variable 
investment is dated in fiscal year 1985 to 1989 and equals zero otherwise. The regression constant 
thus captures the investment in the first subperiod 1980-1984 that is not explained by these firm 
characteristics. The coefficient estimates for these subperiod dummy variables capture the differences 
in constants against that of the period 1980-1984. The results in Table 5 suggest that, relative to the 
first subperiod, firms in all the other subperiods experience significant declines in investment, and the 
magnitude of declines generally increase over time. The regression evidence is consistent with the 
graph in Figure 1 – firms invest less and less over time.    
In the third model, we employ a linear time trend as the only explanatory variable. The 
coefficient estimate indicates a significant decrease in CAPX/A of 0.21% per year. This is consistent 
with our findings in Table 2. Unlike the Dickey-Fuller time-series tests which focus on the mean, 
median, or aggregate measure of investment ratios, our following tests are able to control the firm-
level variations in investment determinants. This allows us to evaluate if the declining trend detected 
in Tables 2 and 3 is explained by variations in firm characteristics.  
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Model 4 is such an example. After controlling for the variations in firm characteristics, the trend 
coefficient is still 0.21% and remains significant at the 1% level. The coefficient estimates for 
characteristics are also similar to those obtained from Model 1. Model 5 includes industry dummies 
and Model 6 controls firm fixed effects. The results are similar to those of Model 4, even though the 
magnitude of decline reduces slightly. In short, controlling for (the time-series and cross-sectional 
variation of) various firm characteristics, we still observe a significant declining trend in investment 
with similar magnitude. The characteristics that are important cross-sectional determinants of 
corporate investment explain little of the time-series decline.  
To test the robustness of our finding, we also control for other characteristic variables including 
market leverage, capital productivity, R&D expenses, credit rating dummy, payout ratio, and sales 
growth. In addition, to control for the potential impact of macroeconomic factors on corporate 
investment, we employ a set of macroeconomic variables including GDP growth, credit spread, short 
interest rate, term spread, unemployment, inflation, and a recession dummy. Most of these variables 
have significant impact on investment, as indicated by their statistically significant coefficient 
estimates; however, the trend coefficient remains negative and statistically significant even with these 
additional controls. The regression results for various specifications are reported in Table 6.  
4.3.  Impact of corporate lifecycle 
Studies have shown that corporate lifecycle is an important factor behind many firm decisions 
such as financing and dividend policies. It is also known that a firm’s investment opportunities are 
abundant in its early life but diminishes over time as it matures. For example, Pastor and Veronesi 
(2003) show a convex decline in a typical firm’s market-to-book ratio along its age. It is possible that 
our findings reflect a maturing process of typical U.S. firms and their diminishing investment 
opportunities.  
We therefore investigate the impact of another firm characteristic, i.e., firm age, on the firm’s 
capital expenditure.  We measure firm age in two different ways: age since the firm is founded or 
since it is listed and included in the CRSP data.  The results are plotted in Figure 4.  The top panel 
plots the average founding or listing (at CRSP) age of our sample firms.  Note that the samples are 
different for the two definitions of firm age; firms with available founding age data are much fewer. 
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We observe the average age of U.S. public firms are about 15 to 25. There is a slightly increasing 
trend of firm age for both age definitions. The bottom panel shows the median CAPX/A for firms of 
different ages. For both age definitions, we find that firms indeed invest more during the first three to 
five years and quickly cut down investment. However, the decline in investment does not persist 
beyond the five-year period; firms instead maintain a flat pace of investment afterwards. The evidence 
suggests that corporate lifecycle is unlikely to be an explanation for the time-series investment decline, 
since most of the firms are much older than five.  Nevertheless, to account for the potential impact of 
corporate life cycle on investment (at least in the first few years), we control for firm age in 
subsequent regressions. 
4.4. New listing effect 
IPOs in the U.S. come in waves. Firms cluster to go public in certain “hot” years while IPO 
activities subside in other “cold” years. Firms listed in different decades often exhibit different 
features in many aspects. Pastor and Veronesi (2005) suggest that technology innovations could be the 
underlying driver behind these waves, which explains that firms going public at different decades 
have their specific characteristics. For example, many IPO firms in 1990s are internet firms. The 
specific characteristics may affect optimal corporate policies. Fama and French (2001), for example, 
find that newly listed firms tend not to pay dividends. Custodio, Ferreira, and Laureano (2013) 
suggest that newly listed firms in recent decades use more short-term debt and are responsible for U.S. 
firms’ general decrease in debt maturity. We thus investigate if the decline in investment is similarly 
driven by newly listed firms.   
To capture the potentially different levels of investment for firms of different listing cohorts, we 
include in the investment regressions six dummy variables that indicate the decade when a firm was 
listed. For example, the 1950-1959 dummy is set to be one if a firm was listed in 1950s and zero 
otherwise. If our finding of the investment decline is driven by newly listed firms, we expect the 
coefficient of the time trend variable to become insignificant after controlling for these listing cohort 
dummies. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7. In all regression models, the coefficient 
estimates of the time trend variable are always significantly negative, and the magnitudes are even 
larger than the magnitude of the estimate from the regression without additional controls (Column 3 
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of Table 5).  This evidence shows that the decline trend of investment is robust to controls of public 
listing cohorts.  
There are also interesting findings regarding the investments of firms in different listing cohorts.  
In the first model of Table 7 that includes the listing dummy variables in addition to a time trend 
variable, the listing dummies have positive and significant coefficient estimates for firms listed in 
1970s and after. This suggests that average investment does vary across listing groups and newer 
firms tend to have higher average investment than firms listed earlier than 1970s. In models that we 
control for the CRSP firm age, all the listing dummies become insignificant, due to the high 
correlation between the CRSP age and listing dummies.  
 
5. Transition of the U.S. economy and the decline in fixed assets investment 
The U.S. economy during our sample period has experienced two substantial transformations. 
First, in economic structure, the services-producing sector has grown rapidly relative to the goods-
producing sector.
13
 According to the BEA data, the value-added of the service (goods) sector as a 
percentage of GDP has grown (declined) steadily from 56 (30.2) percent in 1980 to 66.7 (19.7) 
percent in 2012.  Accordingly, the fraction of workers employed in the service (goods) sector has 
grown (declined) from 53.6 (26.9) percent in 1980 to 68.5 (15.4) percent in 2012. Second, intangible 
capital, as an input in production, becomes increasingly important for U.S. corporations. This trend 
appears to affect every industry in the U.S. economy. Corporate investment in intangible capital has 
increased substantially since 1970s (see, for example, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) and Corrado 
and Hulten (2010)). 
The transition of economic structure predicts that U.S. firms invest more in human capital and 
other intangible assets that are critical to the service-based production and, relatively, invest less in 
physical assets. Recent studies have examined the role of specialized human capital in the growth of 
the service sector and suggested an increasing demand for high-skilled labor in the U.S. economy 
(Lee and Wolpin, 2006; Buera and Kaboski, 2012). Lewis, Siemen, Balay, and Sakate (1992) 
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 According to Bureau of Economic Analysis, the goods-producing sector consists of industries such as 
agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, mining, construction, and manufacturing.  
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investigate service-sector productivity across countries and conclude that the organization of labor – 
how labor is used in combination with other inputs in producing output – is the most important factor 
in explaining difference in productivity across countries. However, less attention has been paid to the 
change in physical capital investment associated with the change of economic structure. Our study 
provides evidence to fill the gap.    
 Intangible capital is intended to facilitate more efficient combination of physical capital and 
human skills into production and thus creates value as an intangible input in the production. Examples 
include expenditures on R&D, information technology, product development and design, marketing, 
business processing systems, and human capital and organizational development (e.g., Lev, 2001; 
Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005; Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou, 2013 and 2014; 
Falato, Kadyrzhanova, and Sim, 2014). Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) and Corrado and Hulten 
(2010) show that intangible investment plays a significant role in labor productivity growth and more 
generally the growth of the U.S. economy. Lustig, Syverson, and Van Nieuwerburgh (2011) suggest 
that intangible capital becomes more important in production because firm productivity growth 
evolves from vintage-specific growth, which only affects new firms, to more general productivity 
growth, which makes all firms more productive. Even for firms that traditionally rely heavily on 
physical capital, investment in intangible capital also helps to improve their production efficiency.  
Overall, a new investment opportunity today may require a firm to invest more in intangible capital 
relative to fixed assets. 
Anecdotal evidence seems consistent with this hypothesis. Companies like Apple, Coach, and 
Nike have focused primarily on product development, design, and marketing, and outsourced the 
manufacturing of products, which requires significant amount of physical capital, to their overseas 
business partners. Retail firms such as Macy’s traditionally need to invest much to own or lease store 
spaces in expensive commercial districts. Current online stores are able to consolidate and build their 
warehouses in much cheaper areas without sacrificing access to potential customers. Studios in 
entertainment industries now can use computers to achieve much of the graphical effects for which 
they used to spend a great amount of capital expenditure. IBM, known as a computer and hardware 
manufacturer, is now according to Wikipedia “a computer technology and IT consulting corporation.”   
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In sum, if the decline in capital expenditure is related to the transition of U.S. economic structure 
and the increasing importance of intangible capital in firm production, we expect to obtain the 
following predictions: (1) Fixed assets as a proportion to the total assets reduce over time; in contrast, 
intangible assets increase its share in the asset structure. (2) The reduction in capital expenditure is 
more significant in new and expanding industries (than in shrinking industries). Also, the marginal 
impact of intangible capital on a firm’s physical capital investment should be greater if the firm has 
traditionally relied more on physical capital in production. Thus, the reduction in capital expenditure 
should be more significant in traditionally capital-expenditure-heavy industries, ceteris paribus. (3) 
The sensitivities of capital investment to firm characteristics, in particular, variables associated with 
investment opportunities, reduce over time. We examine these predictions in the following.  
5.1. The change in asset structure 
If the U.S. economy growth relies more on intangible capital and firms spend less on fixed assets, 
we expect to observe secular changes in assets structure of U.S. firms. Capital expenditure is 
supposed to increase fixed assets, or frequently called plants, property, and equipment (PP&E) in 
accounting terms. If firms continue to reduce capital investment in the past decades, we expect to 
observe a drop in fixed assets as a proportion of total assets. To examine this hypothesis, we 
decompose total assets (AT) into three components: current assets (ACT), net plant, property, and 
equipment (PPENT), and intangible assets (INTAN). Figure 5 plots the mean, median, and aggregate 
ratios of each component relative to total assets. We find a persistent decline in PPENT/AT in all 
three metrics, as a result of the time-series reduction in capital expenditure. On the other hand, we 
find a substantial increase in intangible assets, confirming the increasing importance of intangible 
assets in firms’ production.  
Note our measure of intangible book assets tends to understate intangible capital as defined in the 
literature (e.g., Atkeson and Kehoe, 2005; Corrado, Haltiwanger, and Sichel, 2005; Corrado, Hulten, 
and Sichel, 2009; McGrattan and Prescott, 2010). Unlike capital expenditure, much of the intangible 
capital investment is not recognized as increases in total assets. For example, according to the GAAP, 
R&D is expensed instead of capitalized. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013, 2014) propose a perpetual 
inventory model to estimate firm-level intangible capital stock based on accounting data related to 
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expenditures on R&D, SG&A, and information technology. Following them, we find a significant 
increase in intangible capital stock in U.S. firms. A recent study by Falato, Kadyrzhanove, and Sim 
(2014) obtains the similar finding with the same estimation methodology. 
The ratios of current assets to total assets also decrease over time, which rules out that the decline 
in investment is explained by accumulation of more current assets. One might find the decline in 
current assets surprising since recent studies (e.g., Bates, Kahle, and Stulz, 2009) have shown that 
over this time period U.S. firms increase holdings of cash, which is an important component of 
current assets. Our closer look reveals that, while increasing cash holdings, U.S. firms in the 
meantime reduce non-cash current assets, such as inventory, and the reduction in non-cash current 
assets outweigh in magnitude the increase in cash holdings.  
5.2. The decline in capital investment at the industry level 
Next we investigate how the decline in capital investment is related to the change in industry 
composition and the change in production technology in each industry. Panel A of Table 9 reports, for 
each industry, the number of firms in the industry, the percentage of total assets of the industry 
relative to the whole sample (assets weight), and the aggregate CAPX/A ratio of the industry, 
respectively, in 1980 and 2012. We then compute the changes in the assets weights and the capital 
expenditure ratios during the two time points. The change in assets weight captures if the industry is 
expanding or shrinking in the economy. We find substantial industry variations during our sample 
period. For example, computer software industry in 1980 has only 14 firms which consist of 0.02% in 
assets weight of the sample. The number of firms increases to 157 and their total assets weight 
increases to 4.01% in 2012. Other fast expanding industries include business services, communication, 
and pharmaceutical products. In contrast, the number of firms in steel industry reduces from 81 in 
1980 to 36 in 2012 and its assets weight reduces from 5.28% to 1.73%. Similarly, the construction 
material industry reduces its firm number from 183 to 39 and its assets weight from 3.92% to 0.82%.  
To examine whether the decline in capital expenditure is related to the change in industry 
composition, we perform a cross-industry regression of the change in CAPX/A on the change in 
relative assets weight from 1980 to 2012 (∆(%𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)), and the level of CAPX/A in 1980, 
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𝐴
)
1980
+ 𝑒. 
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 9. We find a statistically significant negative relation 
between the change in capital expenditure and the change in industry assets weight. In general, 
expanding industries incur larger declines in capital investment than shrinking industries. One salient 
example is computer software industry, its assets weight increases by almost 4% during our sample 
period but its CAPX/A drops by almost 18%, the largest among all industries. This finding indicates 
that these growing industries are able to grow their total assets without increasing much capital 
expenditure on fixed assets. We also find a significantly negative coefficient for the beginning level of 
CAPX/A, suggesting that capital expenditure reduces more in the originally CAPX-heavy industries, 
ceteris paribus. The regression results support the change in economic structure and industry variation 
as a driver for the investment decline.  
        We next investigate how change in production technology is related to the decline in capital 
investment. We expect to observe a decrease (increase) in the use of physical (intangible) inputs in 
firm production, consistent with the structural change in the U.S. economy and the increasing 
importance of intangible capital in firm production. Bureau of Economic Analysis’s (BEA) Annual 
Industry Accounts (AIAs) provide the industry-level composition of intermediate inputs in dollar 
value dated back to 1997. Industry intermediate inputs are aggregated into three cost categories – 
energy, materials, and purchased services. The data shows a significant increase in purchased services 
and a significant decrease in materials as a percentage of the industry’s total gross output, while the 
ratio of energy to the industry’s total gross output remains low and flat. This reflects the time-series 
variation of the relative importance of the three inputs in firm production. Materials are the closest 
input among these three to be associated with physical assets. We therefore examine if the industry-
level reduction in capital expenditure is explained by the change in the ratio of materials as an input to 
the industry’s gross output. The last column in Panel B reports the regression results. Indeed, 
industries experiencing the largest drop in the use of materials incur the largest reduction in capital 
expenditure. The evidence lends further support to our previous findings of the decreasing importance 
of physical assets and the increasing importance of services or intangible assets in the production. 
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5.3. The change in the sensitivities of capital investment to firm characteristics 
The increase (decline) in the importance of intangible capital (fixed assets) in firm production 
suggests changes in firm investment patterns. When an investment opportunity arises, a firm in the 
past would invest more in fixed assets to capture it while a firm today would invest more in intangible 
capital to create value. It therefore predicts that, over time, capital expenditure would be less sensitive 
to firm characteristics, in particular, growth opportunities. To examine this prediction, we construct 
dummy variables corresponding to each of the subperiods in Table 4 and interact these dummies with 
firm characteristics on the right hand side of the regressions. Table 8 reports the regression results. 
The first column presents the coefficient estimates of these characteristics for the first and benchmark 
subperiod 1980-1984, and the rest columns report the differences in sensitivities for every other 
subperiod with respect to the first one. We find that the sensitivities indeed vary substantially over 
time. In particular, the sensitivities to market-to-book asset ratio and to cash flow almost 
monotonically decrease since early 1980s. Firms do not increase capital expenditure in reaction to 
new investment opportunities or high profitability as much as they did in the early periods. This is 
consistent with the decreasing importance of physical capital investment as an input in the 
production.
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6. The impact of globalization and international evidence of capital expenditure 
Globalization is one of the most frequently mentioned characteristics of the world economy in 
the last few decades. Several notable events affect the U.S. economy profoundly, that is, North 
American Free Trade Agreement, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Tokyo Round 
and Uruguay Round, World Trade Organization (WTO) and China’s entry into the WTO. It is often 
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 This should be more so in firms that leverage more on intangible capital in their production. We confirm in 
data a significantly negative relation between firms’ stock of intangible capital and the sensitivities of capital 
expenditure to investment opportunities. The results are available from the authors.  
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argued that globalization triggers the move of many labor-intensive manufacturing industries in 
developed economies to emerging economies such as China and India with relatively cheaper labor. A 
salient example is Apple Inc. The U.S.-based headquarter is mainly responsible for design, marketing, 
and support of its new products. Most of the product manufacturing has been outsourced to its Asian 
partner firms. In the apparel industry, few products of the U.S. firms such as Nike, Reebok, and Ralph 
Lauren are really made in the U.S. In a broader sense, globalization facilitates the transition of 
economic structure of developed economies. If this is true, we expect to observe similar patterns of 
investment decline for firms in countries with similar levels of economic development to the U.S. but 
different patterns in countries to which U.S. shifts those shrinking industries. We examine if the 
evidence of investment decline is unique to U.S. firms or similarly observed in other countries.  
Our international data, obtained from DataStream for the period 1980-2013, include 38 non-U.S. 
countries that have at least five years continuous data of at least 50 public-listed firms. Utilities, banks, 
and financial service firms are excluded. Table 10 describe the international sample, including the 
country name, number of firm-year observations, sample period, starting year to have at least 50 firms, 
and the median and aggregate ratios of capital expenditure to total assets (CAPX/A). The last column 
indicates if the country belongs to G7 (U.S. excluded), OECD, or BRICS. Clearly, our data tend to 
include more developed economies due to the poor coverage of emerging economies especially in the 
early decades.  
We plot the median, mean, and aggregate ratios of CAPX/A from the international sample in 
Figure 6. We find declines in all three ratios similar to the U.S. evidence. The median ratio drops from 
6% in 1980 to less than 3% in 2013. The aggregate ratio however shows the least decline. Next we 
investigate the patterns by dividing the countries into two groups, based on if they belong to G7 
(OECD / BRICS) countries or not. Figure 7 presents the patterns. In general, the decline in capital 
expenditure is most evident in G7 and OECD countries, which are also similar to the U.S. evidence, is 
less obvious in other countries and not found in BRICS – the five fastest-growing emerging 
economies. Note for the BRICS sample, we start in 1991 as there are less than 100 data points in the 
years prior to 1991.  
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Next for 31 countries that have at least 12 years data, we run the time-series regressions of the 
Dickey-Fuller test, as we did for the U.S. firms in Table 2. The regression coefficient for the time 
trend variable and its associated t-statistics are reported in Table 11. We find that most countries, 
especially developed economies, incur declines in capital investment. A casual look suggests that 
most developing economies, including BRICS and some other relatively smaller ones, do not 
experience significant investment declines. The results are consistent with our observations in Figure 
6. We conclude that the decline in capital investment is not unique to the U.S. firms. It also occurred 
in other relatively more developed economies such as G7 and OECD countries, but less so for 
growing economies. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that more developed economies 
transfer their economic structure from a production-based one more to a services-orientated one and 
thus require less capital expenditure on fixed assets.  
One consequence of globalization is the flux of foreign products and foreign direct investment 
into US, which strengthens within-industry market competition. In an event study (results untabulated 
in the interest of brevity), we find a significant decrease in capital investment in US firms following 
China’s entry into WTO, consistent with Mello and Wang (2012). Also, using data from Bureau of 
Economic Analysis’s (BEA) Foreign Direct Investment in US that record activities of US affiliates of 
foreign multinational enterprises, we find that US affiliates of foreign multinationals account for an 
increasing proportion of sales in most industries over our sample period, and industries that have 
experienced greater increase in the foreign sales reduce capital investment by more.
18
 The evidence 
suggests that competition from foreign firms is also associated with the within-industry decline in 
capital investment. 
 
7. Conclusion 
We document that the capital expenditure of U.S. public firms declines substantially since 1980s. 
The decline is pervasive: it occurs in almost every industry and is not concentrated in firms with 
certain specific characteristics. The decline is not explained by new listing effects, corporate lifecycle, 
or time-variation of investment opportunities and financial constraint. The decline seems to be related 
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 See http://www.bea.gov/international/di1fdiop.htm. Tabulated results are available upon requests. 
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to the transition of the U.S. economic structure and globalization. When an investment opportunity 
arises, firms in the early period respond with more investment in fixed assets while this sensitivity 
reduces much for firms in the recent decades. Recent firms focus more on developing intangible 
assets and human capital through, e.g., spending on R&D and SG&A. Fixed assets as an input in firm 
production becomes less and less important, consistent with the findings of some recent studies. In 
addition, globalization of the world economy also plays an important role. Industries that incur more 
severe foreign competition tend to cut capital investment more. Firms in economies with similar 
development levels to the U.S. also experience declines in capital investment while firms in fast-
growing emerging economies do not. Our findings have important implications in understanding the 
dynamics of corporate investment and firm production process, and more profoundly, the investment-
related asset pricing.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions  
Variable Definitions 
CAPX/A The ratio of capital expenditure (CAPX) to the book value of total assets at the 
beginning of the year (A). 
Firm size (log(A)) The natural log of book value of total assets (A), adjusted by the CPI. 
Market-to-book 
asset ratio (V/A) 
(book value of total assets – book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value 
of total assets. 
Cash flow (CF/A) Measured as the income before depreciation minus interests, taxes and dividends 
(OIBDP-XINT-TXT-DVC-DVP) to the book value of total assets.  
Market leverage 
(D/V) 
The ratio of total debt (DLTT+DLC) to the market value of assets (book value of total 
assets – book value of equity + market value of equity). 
Cash holdings The ratio of cash holdings (CHE) to the book value of total assets. 
Capital productivity The ratio of total sales (SALE) to the net property, plant and equipment (PPENT). 
Rating dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has a Standard & Poor’s domestic 
long-term issuer credit rating (SPLTICRM) available since 1986.  
Investment-grade 
dummy 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has a credit rating BBB- or above. 
Speculative-grade 
dummy 
Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has a credit rating BB+ or below. 
Payout ratio Measured as the sum of dividends and repurchase (DVC+DVP+PRSTKC)/book value 
of assets. 
Sales growth Measured as the percentage change in the sales from previous year. 
R&D  The ratio of R&D expenses (XRD) to the book value of total assets. 
Age(CRSP) Number of years since first appeared in the CRSP dataset. 
Age(founding) Number of years since foundation (Jay Ritter’s website). 
GDP growth The percentage change in the nominal GDP from previous year (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis)  
Credit spread Difference between BAA- and AAA-rated corporate bond yields (Federal Reserve). 
Short-term rate Yield on 1-year government bonds (Federal Reserve). 
Term spread Difference between the yield on 10-year government bonds and the yield on 1-year 
government bonds (Federal Reserve). 
Inflation Annual percentage change in the consumer price index (Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
Unemployment Unemployment rate (Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
Recession dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if there are at least 1 month in a year 
designated as recession by the NBER. 
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Figure 1 
The ratios of capital expenditure to total assets for U.S. firms in 1980-2012 
 
This figure plots the median, mean, aggregate ratios of capital expenditure to total assets (CAPX/A) 
for the sample firms during 1980-2012. The denominator, total assets, is measured at the beginning of 
the year. The aggregate ratio is calculated as the sum of dollar capital expenditure across all firms 
divided by the sum of these firms’ dollar total assets at the beginning of the year. Our sample consists 
of U.S. firms with common stocks traded at the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during the period of 
1980-2012, with total assets (A) and capital expenditure (CAPX) information available at the 
Compustat fundamental annual file. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 5000) and financial firms 
(SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are excluded. 
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Figure 2 
The ratios of capital expenditure to total assets for U.S. firms in 1980-2012 – adjusted by capital 
goods price index 
 
The numerator of CAPX/A is adjusted by the price index of capital goods.  
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Figure 3 
Variation of firm characteristics over 1980-2012 
 
The top three figures plot the medians of market to book ratio (V/A), firm size (log(A)), and cash flow 
ratio (CF/A).  The last figure plots both mean and median of R&D ratio (RD/A).   
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Figure 4 
Corporate capital expenditure over the lifecycle  
 
The top panel shows the average age for the sample firms in each year. The age is measured in two 
ways: age since founded or since first included in CRSP. The bottom panel shows the median capital 
expenditure to assets ratio (CAPX/A) at different age for the sample firms.  
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Figure 5 
Variation of asset structure in 1980-2012 
 
This figure plots the mean, median, and aggregate ratios of current assets (ACT), net plant, property, 
and equipment (PPENT), and intangible assets (INTAN) relative to total assets (A) for the sample.  
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Figure 6 
International Evidence 
 
This figure plots the median, mean, and aggregate ratios of capital expenditure to total assets 
(CAPX/A) for international firms during 1980-2013. The denominator, total assets, is measured at the 
beginning of the year. The aggregate ratio is calculated as the sum of dollar capital expenditure across 
all firms divided by the sum of these firms’ dollar total assets at the beginning of the year. Our 
international data, obtained from DataStream for the period 1980-2013, include 38 countries that have 
at least five years continuous data of at least 50 public-listed firms. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 
and 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are excluded. More detailed 
information about the data is reported in Table 10. 
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Figure 7 
International evidence by groups 
 
This figure plots the median, mean, and aggregate ratios of capital expenditure to total assets 
(CAPX/A) in 1980-2013 for international firms in different groups. We group firms from 38 countries 
based on if the country belongs to G7, OECD, or BRICS countries.    
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Table 1 - The ratio of capital expenditure to total assets by year: 1980-2012 
 
This table presents the median, mean, and aggregate capital expenditure to total assets ratios (CAPX/A) for the 
sample firms from 1980 to 2012. The denominator, total assets, is measured at the beginning of the year. The 
aggregate ratio is calculated as the sum of dollar capital expenditure across all firms divided by the sum of these 
firms’ dollar total assets at the beginning of the year. Our sample consists of U.S. firms with common stocks 
traded at the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during the period of 1980-2012. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 
and 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are excluded. The last three columns report 
the capital expenditure ratios after adjusting the numerator, CAPX, by the price of capital goods due to 
technology advance.  
FYEAR N 
CAPX/A Adjusted CAPX/A 
Median Mean Aggregate Median Mean Aggregate 
1980 3111 0.078 0.116 0.113 0.078 0.116 0.113 
1981 3163 0.075 0.133 0.108 0.083 0.146 0.118 
1982 3371 0.068 0.109 0.093 0.081 0.129 0.110 
1983 3394 0.063 0.102 0.083 0.077 0.124 0.101 
1984 3619 0.073 0.114 0.092 0.088 0.137 0.111 
1985 3608 0.065 0.103 0.091 0.078 0.124 0.109 
1986 3552 0.059 0.094 0.084 0.071 0.114 0.102 
1987 3795 0.056 0.092 0.078 0.070 0.113 0.096 
1988 3853 0.054 0.082 0.084 0.068 0.103 0.106 
1989 3690 0.051 0.081 0.086 0.066 0.105 0.111 
1990 3661 0.050 0.078 0.085 0.065 0.102 0.112 
1991 3642 0.044 0.069 0.072 0.059 0.092 0.096 
1992 3703 0.047 0.073 0.068 0.062 0.096 0.090 
1993 3974 0.049 0.081 0.067 0.065 0.108 0.089 
1994 4312 0.056 0.090 0.072 0.075 0.121 0.096 
1995 4475 0.058 0.090 0.074 0.079 0.123 0.101 
1996 4677 0.057 0.093 0.076 0.077 0.127 0.104 
1997 4945 0.056 0.092 0.078 0.076 0.123 0.105 
1998 4746 0.056 0.087 0.081 0.074 0.115 0.107 
1999 4403 0.050 0.077 0.072 0.065 0.100 0.094 
2000 4273 0.049 0.082 0.074 0.064 0.107 0.096 
2001 4044 0.035 0.059 0.062 0.045 0.076 0.080 
2002 3795 0.029 0.047 0.048 0.037 0.060 0.062 
2003 3512 0.029 0.048 0.048 0.037 0.060 0.060 
2004 3370 0.031 0.054 0.049 0.040 0.068 0.061 
2005 3307 0.032 0.057 0.053 0.041 0.073 0.068 
2006 3209 0.034 0.062 0.057 0.045 0.082 0.076 
2007 3125 0.033 0.063 0.060 0.044 0.084 0.081 
2008 3075 0.031 0.058 0.057 0.041 0.078 0.076 
2009 2918 0.022 0.038 0.043 0.030 0.051 0.057 
2010 2776 0.027 0.046 0.044 0.035 0.060 0.057 
2011 2700 0.031 0.055 0.050 0.040 0.071 0.065 
2012 2643 0.031 0.055 0.052 0.041 0.071 0.068 
Average 3650 0.048 0.078 0.071 0.060 0.099 0.090 
% Change 
from 1980 
to 2012  -59.67% -53.10% -53.70% -47.74% -39.24% -40.01% 
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Table 2 - Time-series regression of capital expenditure 
This table reports the Dickey-Fuller test results of the following regression:  
∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡+1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛾 ∗ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡
+ 𝜃1 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡
+ 𝜃2 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−1
+ 𝜃3 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−2
+ 𝜃4 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−3
+ 𝜀. 
The dependent variable is the change in the capital expenditure ratio (CAPX/A) between fiscal year t+1 and t. 
The independent variables include the time trend variable (Trend), the CAPX/A in fiscal year t, and four lagged 
changes in the capital expenditure ratios. The regressions are respectively performed on the yearly median, 
mean, and aggregate ratios of capital expenditure to total assets. The table reports the regression coefficient 
estimates and the associated t-statistics in parentheses. Statistical significance of the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is 
marked by ***, **, and *, respectively. Our sample consists of U.S. firms with common stocks traded at the 
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during the period of 1980-2012. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 5000) and 
financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are excluded.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Median Mean Aggregate 
        
Trend*1000 -0.695** -1.371*** -1.489*** 
 
(-2.52) (-3.36) (-3.42) 
CAPX/A(t) -0.527*** -0.736*** -0.907*** 
 
(-2.84) (-3.75) (-3.62) 
CAPX/A(t)-CAPX/A(t-1) 0.326* 0.396** 0.749*** 
 
(1.73) (2.22) (3.58) 
CAPX/A(t-1)-CAPX/A(t-2) 0.177 0.156 0.217 
 
(0.97) (0.88) (1.06) 
CAPX/A(t-2)-CAPX/A(t-3) 0.142 0.383** 0.105 
 
(0.82) (2.35) (0.61) 
CAPX/A(t-3)-CAPX/A(t-4) 0.138 0.205 0.294 
 (0.76) (1.12) (1.58) 
Constant 0.037** 0.082*** 0.092*** 
 
(2.66) (3.62) (3.49) 
 
  
 Observations 33 33 33 
R-squared 0.092 0.262 0.379 
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Table 3 - Industry-level test of time trend in capital expenditure 
 
This table reports the Dickey-Fuller test results of the following regression for each industry:  
∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡+1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛾 ∗ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡
+ 𝜃1 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡
+ 𝜃2 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−1
+ 𝜃3 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−2
+ 𝜃4 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−3
+ 𝜀. 
The dependent variable is the change in CAPX/A between fiscal year t+1 and t. The independent variables include the time trend variable (Trend), the CAPX/A in fiscal year 
t, and four lagged changes in the capital expenditure ratios. The regressions are performed separately for each industry on its yearly median, mean, and aggregate capital 
expenditure ratios. The aggregate ratio is calculated as the sum of dollar capital expenditure across all firms in the industry divided by the sum of these firms’ dollar total 
assets at the beginning of the year. Industries are classified as in Fama and French (1997). Our sample consists of U.S. firms with common stocks traded at the NYSE, AMEX, 
or NASDAQ during the period of 1980-2012. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are excluded.The 
coefficient on Time Trend is inflated by 1000. Statistical significance of the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is marked by ***, **, and *, respectively.  
 CAPX/AT (median) CAPX/AT (mean) CAPX/AT (aggregate) 
Industry Name 
Time Trend 
Coefficient t-stat 
Time Trend 
Coefficient t-stat 
Time Trend 
Coefficient t-stat 
Agriculture -0.887* (-1.99) -3.043*** (-3.81) -1.967** (-2.66) 
Aircraft -0.481 (-1.59) -0.579 (-1.61) -0.659** (-2.31) 
Apparel -0.068 (-0.63) -0.421** (-2.39) -0.481*** (-2.97) 
Automobiles and Trucks -0.301 (-1.53) -0.316 (-1.61) -0.781** (-2.47) 
Beer & Liquor -0.953** (-2.40) -1.232** (-2.26) -1.179** (-2.23) 
Business Services -0.742** (-2.74) -1.452*** (-3.62) -0.774* (-2.01) 
Business Supplies -1.609* (-2.01) -1.297 (-1.58) -2.070* (-1.87) 
Candy & Soda -0.956 (-1.46) -1.131 (-1.60) -0.661 (-1.20) 
Chemicals -0.850** (-2.17) -0.927* (-1.80) -1.040** (-2.27) 
Coal 0.462 (0.91) -0.349 (-0.42) 0.099 (0.20) 
Communication -1.184* (-2.00) -1.642** (-2.34) -1.102** (-2.21) 
Computer Software  -1.058*** (-2.89) -2.154*** (-3.46) -1.339 (-1.64) 
Computers -0.539 (-1.45) -1.117* (-1.73) -2.229*** (-3.65) 
Construction -1.063** (-2.55) -1.195** (-2.26) -0.606 (-1.65) 
Construction Materials -0.434* (-1.77) -0.579* (-1.86) -0.972* (-1.99) 
Consumer Goods -0.482** (-2.13) -0.628** (-2.57) -1.528*** (-3.53) 
Defence -2.056*** (-4.15) -1.745*** (-3.02) -2.060** (-2.45) 
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Electrical Equipment -0.464* (-2.02) -0.892** (-2.30) -1.045** (-2.77) 
Electronic Equipment -0.835** (-2.77) -1.111** (-2.57) -1.310** (-2.13) 
Entertainment -1.370** (-2.19) -2.024** (-2.62) -3.143*** (-3.12) 
Fabricated Products 0.085 (0.33) -0.540 (-1.45) 0.996** (2.73) 
Food Products -0.911** (-2.44) -0.878*** (-2.85) -0.701** (-2.68) 
Healthcare -1.158** (-2.21) -1.962*** (-3.61) -1.950*** (-3.16) 
Machinery -0.620** (-2.48) -1.046** (-2.76) -0.844** (-2.70) 
Measuring and Control Equipment -0.767** (-2.56) -1.373*** (-3.14) -2.084*** (-3.15) 
Medical Equipment -0.835*** (-3.17) -1.402* (-2.00) -1.461*** (-3.91) 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining -0.397 (-0.73) -2.116** (-2.52) -0.459 (-1.16) 
Other - almost Nothing -1.153** (-2.47) -1.416* (-2.04) -1.555** (-2.25) 
Personal Services -0.730** (-2.65) -1.576** (-2.07) -0.517 (-0.50) 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.806 (0.84) 0.405 (0.41) 0.332 (0.98) 
Pharmaceutical Products -2.741*** (-4.92) -3.054*** (-4.70) -0.237 (-1.57) 
Precious Metals -0.477 (-0.75) -2.434* (-1.93) -1.945* (-1.87) 
Printing and Publishing -0.975** (-2.36) -0.788** (-2.76) -0.726** (-2.12) 
Recreation -0.642*** (-2.80) -1.178*** (-3.41) -1.190* (-1.99) 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels -1.686*** (-3.04) -1.752*** (-2.79) -2.429*** (-3.27) 
Retail  -0.586** (-2.42) -0.643** (-2.66) -0.534** (-2.40) 
Rubber and Plastic Products -0.674* (-1.83) -1.005* (-1.90) -0.405 (-0.96) 
Ship Building, Railroad Equipment -0.467 (-0.76) -0.236 (-0.39) -0.634 (-1.24) 
Shipping Containers -0.719 (-1.68) -0.865 (-1.48) -0.741* (-1.72) 
Steel Works  -0.381 (-1.52) -0.475* (-1.75) -0.767** (-2.35) 
Textiles -0.499 (-1.66) -0.574* (-1.90) -0.805* (-2.01) 
Tobacco Products -0.510* (-2.01) -0.582* (-1.78) -0.840** (-2.42) 
Transportation -2.410*** (-3.04) -2.731*** (-2.82) -2.069** (-2.55) 
Wholesale -0.449** (-2.65) -0.745*** (-2.91) -0.299 (-1.65) 
Number (%) of declines  41 (93.18%) 43 (97.73%) 42 (95.45%) 
Number (%) of significant declines 30 (68.18%) 35 (79.55%) 33 (75.00%) 
43 
 
Table 4 - Capital expenditure by groups of firms 
 
This table reports the time series average by groups of firms of the media capital expenditure ratio (CAPX/A).  The breakpoint for high/low and small/large groups is the 
yearly 50
th
 percentile of each firm characteristic.  Non-R&D firms are firms which have never reported any R&D expenditure. Non-Acquirer firms are firms which have 
never reported any acquisition expenditure. We also run regression of the yearly median CAPX/A on a constant and a time trend variable for each group. The last two 
columns report the coefficient estimates for the time trend variable (inflated by 1000) and the associated p-value. Our sample consists of U.S. firms with common stocks 
traded at the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during the period of 1980-2012. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 
7000) are excluded. Variable definitions are available in the appendix. 
Characteristic Variables Subsample 
1980-
1984 
1985-
1989 
1990-
1994 
1995-
1999 
2000-
2004 
2005-
2012 
1980-
2012 
Trend 
x1000 p-value 
Market to Book Assets Low 0.055 0.047 0.040 0.047 0.029 0.027 0.041 -0.107 0.000 
 
High 0.095 0.069 0.061 0.064 0.040 0.033 0.060 -0.311 0.000 
Sales Growth Low 0.054 0.049 0.041 0.047 0.029 0.026 0.041 -0.128 0.000 
 
High 0.088 0.065 0.058 0.063 0.040 0.034 0.058 -0.235 0.000 
Cash Flow/Assets Low 0.050 0.037 0.032 0.038 0.023 0.021 0.034 -0.257 0.000 
 
High 0.094 0.080 0.070 0.073 0.049 0.043 0.070 -0.161 0.000 
Assets Small 0.065 0.047 0.040 0.046 0.028 0.024 0.041 -0.253 0.000 
 
Large 0.076 0.065 0.058 0.063 0.040 0.035 0.057 -0.165 0.000 
Payout Ratio Low 0.071 0.050 0.043 0.052 0.032 0.027 0.045 -0.160 0.000 
 
High 0.072 0.062 0.054 0.058 0.036 0.033 0.053 -0.153 0.000 
Bond Rating Dummy Unrated 
 
0.054 0.047 0.054 0.034 0.030 0.043 -0.160 0.000 
 
Rated 
 
0.069 0.062 0.063 0.040 0.037 0.050 -0.153 0.000 
Bond Ratings Speculative 
 
0.054 0.049 0.057 0.035 0.037 0.043 -0.113 0.000 
 
Investment 
 
0.079 0.069 0.068 0.044 0.038 0.056 -0.205 0.000 
Leverage Low 0.084 0.063 0.054 0.056 0.033 0.027 0.053 -0.294 0.000 
 
High 0.061 0.052 0.044 0.054 0.035 0.033 0.047 -0.124 0.000 
Cash Holdings Low 0.067 0.056 0.048 0.057 0.037 0.035 0.050 -0.139 0.000 
 
High 0.077 0.058 0.051 0.053 0.031 0.025 0.049 -0.278 0.000 
Capital Productivity Low 0.100 0.074 0.066 0.074 0.047 0.045 0.068 -0.258 0.000 
 
High 0.053 0.045 0.037 0.043 0.026 0.022 0.037 -0.160 0.000 
R&D Non-R&D  0.073 0.059 0.051 0.062 0.042 0.040 0.056 -0.179 0.000 
 
R&D Firms 0.070 0.056 0.048 0.050 0.030 0.024 0.045 -0.213 0.000 
Acquisition Non-Acquirer 0.068 0.050 0.043 0.052 0.035 0.026 0.049 -0.204 0.000 
 
Acquirer 0.072 0.059 0.051 0.055 0.034 0.030 0.050 -0.201 0.000 
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Table 5 – Cross-sectional regressions of capital expenditure on firm characteristics 
 
This table reports the estimates of OLS regressions of capital expenditure ratio (CAPX/A). The explanatory 
variables consist of a time trend variable and firm characteristics including size measured as the log of total 
assets (log(A)), market-to-book ratio of assets (V/A), and cash flow to assets ratio (CF/A). Firm characteristics 
are lagged by one fiscal year. In Model 2, we also include dummy variables for subperiods. Our sample consists 
of U.S. firms with common stocks traded at the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during the period of 1980-2012. 
Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are 
excluded. Variable definitions are available in the appendix. The table reports the regression coefficient 
estimates and the robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-leveling clustering in parentheses. Statistical significance 
of the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is marked by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Industry Fixed 
Effects 
Firm Fixed 
Effects 
Trend*1000 
  
-2.065*** -2.078*** -1.857*** -1.524*** 
   
(-33.25) (-33.30) (-33.37) (-22.33) 
log(A) -0.004*** -0.001*** 
 
-0.001*** -0.002*** -0.019*** 
 
(-10.92) (-3.46) 
 
(-2.99) (-6.25) (-22.65) 
V/A 0.010*** 0.011*** 
 
0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 
(26.59) (29.09) 
 
(28.78) (31.66) (28.20) 
CF/A 0.101*** 0.090*** 
 
0.090*** 0.081*** 0.064*** 
 
(33.57) (29.65) 
 
(29.71) (28.78) (21.59) 
1985-1989 dummy 
 
-0.023*** 
    
  
(-14.25) 
    1990-1994 dummy 
 
-0.037*** 
    
  
(-21.50) 
    1995-1999 dummy 
 
-0.029*** 
    
  
(-15.86) 
    2000-2004 dummy 
 
-0.056*** 
    
  
(-32.48) 
    2005-2012 dummy 
 
-0.059*** 
    
  
(-32.22) 
    Constant 0.075*** 0.098*** 0.114*** 0.096*** 0.050*** 0.159*** 
 
(44.02) (46.90) (87.64) (53.55) (9.11) (46.64) 
       Observations 111,965 111,965 111,965 111,965 111,965 111,965 
R-squared 0.049 0.083 0.032 0.079 0.200 0.116 
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Table 6 – Cross-sectional regressions of capital expenditure: additional firm characteristics and macroeconomic factors 
 
This table reports the estimates of OLS regressions of capital expenditure ratio (CAPX/A). The explanatory variables consist of a time trend variable and firm characteristics 
including size measured as the log of total assets (log(A)), market-to-book ratio of assets (V/A), cash flow to assets ratio (CF/A), market leverage (D/V), capital productivity 
measured as sales divided by the gross property, plant and equipment (Sales/PPEGT), R&D expenses to assets ratio (RD/A), credit rating dummy, payout to assets ratio 
(Payout/A), sales growth, and a set of macroeconomic variables. Both firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables are lagged by one fiscal year. Our sample consists of 
U.S. firms with common stocks traded at the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during the period of 1980-2012. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 5000) and financial firms 
(SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are excluded. Variable definitions are available in the appendix. The table reports the regression coefficient estimates and the robust t-
statistics adjusted for firm-leveling clustering in parentheses. Statistical significance of the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is marked by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Trend*1000 -1.646*** -1.136*** -1.632*** -1.461*** -1.306*** -1.672*** -1.061*** -1.509*** -1.599*** -1.335*** -1.679*** 
 
(-26.35) (-14.73) (-26.25) (-23.79) (-18.38) (-28.00) (-11.33) (-23.22) (-26.39) (-18.52) (-27.36) 
log(A) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 
(-8.09) (-7.04) (-6.80) (-4.70) (-8.34) (-8.03) (-8.35) (-8.35) (-8.14) (-8.50) (-8.03) 
V/A 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 
(27.22) (22.78) (27.53) (21.54) (27.12) (27.02) (27.21) (27.06) (27.31) (27.34) (27.04) 
CF/A 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 
 
(21.34) (17.63) (20.82) (20.86) (21.34) (21.31) (21.47) (21.39) (21.34) (21.31) (21.31) 
D/V -0.033*** -0.031*** -0.037*** -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** -0.034*** -0.033*** 
 
(-9.76) (-8.01) (-10.82) (-7.62) (-9.64) (-9.76) (-9.82) (-9.98) (-9.63) (-9.86) (-9.60) 
Sales/PPEGT -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(-33.00) (-29.33) (-33.04) (-30.61) (-33.01) (-33.00) (-33.07) (-33.02) (-33.04) (-33.09) (-32.96) 
RD/A -0.114*** -0.108*** -0.117*** -0.094*** -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.113*** -0.114*** -0.113*** 
 
(-18.61) (-16.31) (-19.05) (-14.90) (-18.61) (-18.61) (-18.64) (-18.68) (-18.57) (-18.73) (-18.55) 
Rating dummy  0.003*          
 
 (1.70)          
Payout/A   -0.084***         
 
  (-9.99)         
Sales growth    0.015***        
 
   (17.42)        
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GDP growth     0.171***       
 
    (12.08)       
Credit Spread      -0.001      
 
     (-1.46)      
Short Term Rate       0.002***     
 
      (8.02)     
Term Spread        -0.003***    
 
       (-9.62)    
Unemployment         0.001***   
 
        (4.24)   
Inflation          0.160***  
 
         (6.93)  
Recession dummy           -0.005*** 
 
          (-6.77) 
Constant 0.121*** 0.112*** 0.121*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.123*** 0.101*** 0.123*** 0.114*** 0.110*** 0.122*** 
 
(58.62) (45.50) (59.07) (52.33) (44.15) (52.19) (33.08) (59.03) (45.98) (45.60) (59.60) 
 
           
Observations 111,965 79,870 111,965 100,530 111,965 111,965 111,965 111,965 111,965 111,965 111,965 
R-squared 0.124 0.109 0.126 0.129 0.125 0.124 0.125 0.125 0.124 0.125 0.125 
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Table 7 - Cross-sectional regressions of capital expenditure with new listing groups 
 
This table reports the estimates of OLS regressions of capital expenditure ratio (CAPX/A). The explanatory 
variables consist of a time trend variable and firm characteristics including size measured as the log of total 
assets (log(A)), market-to-book ratio of assets (V/A), cash flow to assets ratio (CF/A), market leverage (D/V), 
capital productivity measured as sales divided by the gross property, plant and equipment (Sales/PPEGT), R&D 
expenses to assets ratio (RD/A), credit rating dummy, payout to assets ratio (Payout/A), sales growth, a set of 
listing dummy variables and firm age. Firm characteristics are lagged by one fiscal year. Our sample consists of 
U.S. firms with common stocks traded at the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during the period of 1980-2012. 
Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are 
excluded. Variable definitions are available in the appendix. The table reports the regression coefficient 
estimates and the robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-leveling clustering in parentheses. Statistical significance 
of the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is marked by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Trend*1000 -2.695*** -2.425*** -2.352*** -3.272*** 
 
(-36.66) (-11.07) (-12.71) (-26.51) 
1950-1959 listing dummy 0.005 -0.001 0.002 
 
 
(1.09) (-0.20) (0.38) 
 1960-1969 listing dummy -0.001 -0.011 -0.003 
 
 
(-0.52) (-1.42) (-0.46) 
 1970-1979 listing dummy 0.013*** 0.002 0.004 -0.045*** 
 
(5.45) (0.19) (0.50) (-6.61) 
1980-1989 listing dummy 0.026*** 0.011 0.013 -0.056*** 
 
(10.77) (0.96) (1.29) (-12.35) 
1990-1999 listing dummy 0.033*** 0.015 0.020* -0.042*** 
 
(13.66) (1.12) (1.73) (-9.38) 
2000-2012 listing dummy 0.037*** 0.017 0.022* -0.036*** 
 
(12.14) (1.10) (1.71) (-7.39) 
log(A) 
  
-0.000 0.001 
   
(-0.39) (1.63) 
V/A 
  
0.011*** 0.009*** 
   
(30.90) (23.38) 
CF/A 
  
0.081*** 0.067*** 
   
(28.92) (19.30) 
Age(CRSP) 
 
-0.000 -0.000 
 
  
(-1.35) (-1.01) 
 Age(Founding) 
   
-0.000*** 
    
(-6.87) 
Constant 0.103*** 0.117*** 0.048*** 0.169*** 
 (48.89) (11.36) (4.59) (14.73) 
 
    Industry Dummies No No Yes Yes 
Observations 111,965 111,965 111,965 47,830 
R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.206 0.229 
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Table 8 – The sensitivities of capital expenditure to firm characteristics across time 
 
This table reports the change in the sensitivities of capital expenditure ratio (CAPX/A) to firm characteristics 
across different time periods. The explanatory variables consist of a time trend variable and firm characteristics 
including size measured as the log of total assets (log(A)), market-to-book ratio of assets (V/A), and cash flow 
to assets ratio (CF/A). Firm characteristics are lagged by one fiscal year. Our sample consists of U.S. firms with 
common stocks traded at the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during the period of 1980-2012. Utilities (SIC codes 
between 4900 and 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are excluded. Variable 
definitions are available in the appendix. The table reports the regression coefficient estimates and the robust t-
statistics adjusted for firm-leveling clustering in parentheses. Statistical significance of the 1%, 5%, or 10% 
level is marked by ***, **, and *, respectively.   
 
 
Estimate 
1980-1984 
Interaction  
1985-1989 
Interaction  
1990-1994 
Interaction  
1995-1999 
Interaction  
2000-2004 
Interaction  
2005-2012 
         
      log(A) -0.003*** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003*** 
 
(-3.64) (1.95) (3.19) (2.51) (2.56) (3.79) 
V/A 0.030*** -0.015*** -0.018*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
 
(18.61) (-8.31) (-10.05) (-12.53) (-14.80) (-14.01) 
CF/A 0.260*** -0.136*** -0.144*** -0.181*** -0.209*** -0.202*** 
 
(16.00) (-7.77) (-8.17) (-10.72) (-12.52) (-12.07) 
Constant 0.002 -0.012** 0.007 -0.015*** -0.025*** 0.065*** 
 
(0.39) (-2.38) (1.27) (-2.92) (-4.86) (14.64) 
       Observations 111,965 
R-squared 0.103 
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Table 9 - Industry variation and the decline in capital expenditure 
 
Panel A of this table reports the number of firms, the percentage of the industry assets relative to the total assets 
of all firms in the sample, and the aggregate capital expenditure ratio on each industry in 1980 and 2012. The 
aggregate capital expenditure ratio (CAPX/A) is calculated as the sum of dollar capital expenditure across all 
firms in the industry divided by the sum of these firms’ dollar total assets at the beginning of the year. Our 
sample consists of U.S. firms with common stocks traded at the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ during the period 
of 1980-2012. Utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 
7000) are excluded. Panel B reports the results from the cross-industry regressions of the change in CAPX/A on 
the change in assets weight from 1980 to 2012 and/or the level of CAPX/A at 1980. The last column of Panel B 
reports the industry-level panel regression results of the change in capital expenditures on the change in the ratio 
of materials as an intermediate input to the gross output. Industries are classified by 3-digit SIC codes and the 
sample is from 1997 to 2012. Statistical significance of the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is marked by ***, **, and *, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A Industry composition and industry capital expenditure ratios 
 Num. of Firms %Assets CAPX/A (aggregate) 
Industry 1980 2012 1980 2012 change 1980 2012 change 
Agriculture 17 6 0.20% 0.04% -0.16% 0.0782 0.0432 -0.0351 
Aircraft 29 21 2.24% 2.77% 0.53% 0.0892 0.0244 -0.0647 
Apparel 73 30 0.99% 0.61% -0.38% 0.0576 0.0377 -0.0200 
Automobiles and 
Trucks 66 52 5.00% 3.06% -1.94% 0.0857 0.0547 -0.0310 
Beer & Liquor 16 10 0.69% 0.32% -0.37% 0.1268 0.0192 -0.1076 
Business Services 160 254 2.00% 5.56% 3.56% 0.0713 0.0355 -0.0359 
Business Supplies 44 38 2.68% 1.71% -0.97% 0.1475 0.0503 -0.0971 
Candy & Soda 17 12 0.73% 1.93% 1.20% 0.1286 0.0373 -0.0913 
Chemicals 84 66 6.05% 3.50% -2.55% 0.1302 0.0522 -0.0780 
Coal 7 8 0.31% 0.73% 0.42% 0.1640 0.0648 -0.0992 
Communication 35 88 2.24% 7.28% 5.04% 0.1381 0.0605 -0.0776 
Computer Software  14 157 0.02% 4.01% 3.99% 0.2102 0.0319 -0.1783 
Computers 84 58 2.79% 4.33% 1.54% 0.1229 0.0395 -0.0834 
Construction 43 39 0.74% 0.88% 0.14% 0.0876 0.0174 -0.0702 
Construction 
Materials 183 39 3.92% 0.82% -3.11% 0.1013 0.0305 -0.0708 
Consumer Goods 125 40 4.61% 1.82% -2.79% 0.0973 0.0438 -0.0536 
Defence 9 5 0.99% 0.06% -0.93% 0.0931 0.0325 -0.0606 
Electrical 
Equipment 51 50 1.17% 0.76% -0.41% 0.0851 0.0292 -0.0559 
Electronic 
Equipment 161 196 3.24% 5.33% 2.09% 0.1307 0.0368 -0.0940 
Entertainment 30 38 0.59% 2.07% 1.48% 0.1418 0.0368 -0.1050 
Fabricated 
Products 26 6 0.44% 0.06% -0.38% 0.0274 0.0654 0.0380 
Food Products 79 46 4.02% 2.63% -1.39% 0.0807 0.0345 -0.0462 
Healthcare 29 54 0.32% 1.58% 1.26% 0.1514 0.0459 -0.1056 
Machinery 152 98 4.36% 4.51% 0.15% 0.0956 0.0463 -0.0492 
Measuring and 
Control Equipment 81 61 0.74% 1.25% 0.51% 0.1117 0.0206 -0.0911 
Medical Equipment 45 111 0.83% 2.32% 1.48% 0.1039 0.0305 -0.0733 
Non-Metallic and 
Industrial Metal 16 9 1.03% 0.36% -0.67% 0.1687 0.0754 -0.0932 
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Mining 
Other - almost 
Nothing 343 178 1.99% 1.02% -0.96% 0.0854 0.0566 -0.0288 
Personal Services 38 38 0.43% 0.72% 0.29% 0.1488 0.1064 -0.0424 
Petroleum and 
Natural Gas 178 137 13.66% 10.06% -3.60% 0.1625 0.1267 -0.0358 
Pharmaceutical 
Products 44 184 2.84% 5.64% 2.80% 0.0746 0.0253 -0.0493 
Precious Metals 8 10 0.04% 0.71% 0.67% 0.1067 0.1099 0.0033 
Printing and 
Publishing 44 30 1.03% 1.10% 0.07% 0.0920 0.0184 -0.0736 
Recreation 37 23 0.52% 0.22% -0.30% 0.0994 0.0334 -0.0660 
Restaurants, 
Hotels, Motels 67 54 1.16% 1.92% 0.75% 0.1574 0.0647 -0.0927 
Retail  219 153 6.48% 7.76% 1.28% 0.0953 0.0527 -0.0426 
Rubber and Plastic 
Products 43 15 0.44% 0.21% -0.23% 0.0760 0.0422 -0.0338 
Shipbuilding, 
Railroad 
Equipment 6 7 0.51% 0.56% 0.05% 0.1224 0.0281 -0.0942 
Shipping 
Containers 40 9 1.93% 0.35% -1.58% 0.1013 0.0404 -0.0609 
Steel Works  81 36 5.28% 1.73% -3.55% 0.0910 0.0447 -0.0463 
Textiles 63 10 0.94% 0.11% -0.83% 0.0796 0.0330 -0.0466 
Tobacco Products 9 6 2.12% 1.01% -1.11% 0.0796 0.0146 -0.0650 
Transportation 80 65 5.53% 4.02% -1.50% 0.1455 0.0798 -0.0657 
Wholesale 135 96 2.12% 2.55% 0.43% 0.0688 0.0229 -0.0460 
 
Panel B Regression of changes in CAPX/A 
 1 
 
2 3 4 
Change in %Assets -0.604** 
(-2.19) 
 -0.348* 
(-1.85) 
 
CAPX/A (1980)  -0.743*** 
(-7.56) 
-0.709*** 
(-7.29) 
 
Change in 
Material/Output 
   0.158*** 
(4.40) 
Constant  -0.064*** 
(-12.73) 
0.017 
(1.53) 
0.014 
(1.22) 
-0.003*** 
(-7.33) 
     
Observations 44 44 44 3843 
R-squared 0.102 0.577 0.609 0.040 
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Table 10 – Descriptive statistics of international data 
Our international data, obtained from DataStream, include 38 countries in the period 1980-2013 that have at 
least five years continuous data of at least 50 public-listed firms. Utilities, banks, and financial service firms are 
excluded. This table reports, respectively for the 38 countries in the international sample, the firm-year 
observation number, sample period, starting year to have at least 50 firms, and the median and aggregate ratios 
of capital expenditure to total assets (CAPX/A). The last column indicates if the country belongs to G7, OECD, 
or BRICS.  
 
 
Country 
Firm-Year 
Obs 
Sample 
period 
Starting 
Year with 
50+ obs 
Median 
CAPX/A 
Aggregate 
CAPX/A 
G7 / OECD 
/ BRICS 
Australia 14350 1980-2013 1994 3.706 7.965 OECD 
Belgium 1465 1980-2013 1998 4.833 7.090 OECD 
Brazil 2893 1987-2013 1998 4.056 6.819 BRICS 
Canada 21114 1980-2013 1987 5.090 8.987 G7/OECD 
Chile 1947 1985-2013 1998 4.594 5.807 OECD 
China 23378 1991-2013 1995 4.559 6.565 BRICS 
Denmark 1946 1980-2013 1995 4.844 7.035 OECD 
Finland 2052 1980-2013 1996 4.991 5.753 OECD 
France 8410 1980-2013 1987 3.547 4.884 G7/OECD 
Germany 9341 1980-2013 1986 4.145 6.302 G7/OECD 
Greece 1909 1985-2013 2001 2.563 5.193 OECD 
Hong Kong 14116 1980-2013 1990 2.745 4.769 
 India 19478 1989-2013 1992 5.028 8.650 BRICS 
Indonesia 4712 1989-2013 1991 4.435 12.942 
 Israel 2885 1992-2013 2001 2.111 5.068 OECD 
Italy 2687 1980-2013 1996 3.008 4.698 G7/OECD 
Japan 47524 1980-2013 1980 2.605 3.979 G7/OECD 
Malaysia 10507 1980-2013 1991 2.696 5.704 
 Mexico 1614 1980-2013 1997 4.204 6.001 OECD 
Netherland 1955 1980-2013 1992 4.813 5.646 OECD 
New Zealand 1149 1980-2013 2004 4.266 7.479 OECD 
Norway 2010 1980-2013 1999 5.156 9.325 OECD 
Pakistan 1637 1988-2013 1999 4.646 7.402 
 Peru 1110 1987-2013 2000 3.620 8.131 
 Philippine 1973 1988-2013 1998 3.006 7.221 
 Poland 3263 1992-2013 2002 4.073 7.214 OECD 
Russia 2319 1996-2013 2004 4.085 7.999 BRICS 
Singapore 7556 1980-2013 1992 2.915 4.866 
 South Africa 3407 1980-2013 1997 5.240 8.234 BRICS 
South Korea 17444 1980-2013 1989 3.736 5.446 OECD 
Spain 1728 1980-2013 1996 3.544 5.905 OECD 
Sri Lanka 1462 1993-2013 2005 3.648 7.888 
 Sweden 4222 1980-2013 1995 2.680 5.043 OECD 
Switzerland 2967 1980-2013 1990 3.931 4.401 OECD 
Taiwan 19275 1988-2013 1994 3.018 6.535 
 Thailand 6380 1987-2013 1991 3.752 6.793 
 Turkey 2918 1987-2013 1998 3.627 6.000 OECD 
United Kingdom      17423 1980-2013 1980 3.443 6.010 G7/OECD 
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Table 11 – International evidence of trend in capital investment by countries 
This table reports the Dickey-Fuller test results of the following regression for firms in each country:  
∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡+1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑 + 𝛾 ∗ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡
+ 𝜃1 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡
+ 𝜃2 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−1
+ 𝜃3 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−2
+ 𝜃4 ∗ ∆ (
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋
𝐴
)
𝑡−3
+ 𝜀. 
The dependent variable is the change in CAPX/A between fiscal year t+1 and t. The independent variables 
include the time trend variable (Trend), the CAPX/A in fiscal year t, and four lagged changes in the capital 
expenditure ratios. The regressions are performed separately for each country on its yearly median, mean, and 
aggregate capital expenditure ratios. The aggregate ratio is calculated as the sum of dollar capital expenditure 
across all firms in the country divided by the sum of these firms’ dollar total assets at the beginning of the year. 
We require the country to have at least 12 years qualified data and 31 out of 38 countries are qualified. Utilities 
(SIC codes between 4900 and 5000) and financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 and 7000) are excluded.The 
coefficient on Trend is inflated by 1000. Statistical significance of the 1%, 5%, or 10% level is marked by ***, 
**, and *, respectively.  
 CAPX/A (median) CAPX/A (mean) CAPX/A (aggregate) 
Country 
Time Trend 
Coefficient t-stat 
Time Trend 
Coefficient t-stat 
Time Trend 
Coefficient t-stat 
Australia -0.050 -1.53 0.013 0.44 -0.041 -1.64 
Belgium -0.070** -2.71 -0.054** -2.5 -0.058 -1.43 
Brazil -0.049 -1.36 -0.036 -0.85 -0.066 -1.03 
Canada -0.052** -2.08 0.062* 1.97 0.019 0.9 
Chile -0.108 -1.11 -0.132* -1.88 -0.144* -1.89 
China -0.004 -0.17 -0.018 -0.54 -0.072 -1.49 
Denmark -0.188*** -4.08 -0.104** -2.74 -0.055** -2.06 
Finland -0.259*** -4.98 -0.235*** -4.79 -0.250*** -4.89 
France -0.091*** -2.85 -0.089*** -3.64 -0.062*** -3.14 
Germany -0.070** -2.37 -0.059** -2.42 -0.076*** -3.72 
Hong Kong -0.163*** -4.39 -0.207*** -3.76 -0.059* -1.78 
India -0.054 -1.38 -0.029 -0.63 0.026 0.33 
Indonesia 0.110* 1.89 0.040 0.83 2.457** 2.4 
Italy -0.086*** -4.01 -0.090*** -4.34 -0.049** -2.38 
Japan -0.080** -2.52 -0.094*** -3.13 0.034* 1.85 
Malaysia -0.018 -1.27 -0.019 -0.91 0.001 0.04 
Mexico -0.027 -1.19 -0.037 -1.54 -0.039 -1.35 
Netherland -0.069*** -3.34 -0.086*** -3.14 -0.073*** -4.3 
Norway -0.255** -2.33 -0.318*** -3.85 -0.069 -1.05 
Pakistan -0.042 -0.85 -0.042 -0.75 -0.091 -1.04 
Philippine -0.162 -0.94 -0.016 -0.12 -0.224 -1.51 
Singapore -0.018 -0.95 -0.021 -0.85 -0.081 -1.32 
South Africa -0.084** -2.1 -0.045** -2.62 0.011 0.67 
South Korea -0.079* -1.73 -0.051* -1.81 -0.019 -1.51 
Spain -0.079** -2.68 -0.070** -2.63 -0.166*** -3.04 
Sweden -0.095*** -2.97 -0.072** -2.61 -0.032* -1.79 
Switzerland -0.061*** -3.26 -0.070*** -3.47 -0.032** -2.27 
Taiwan -0.152** -2.55 -0.173*** -3.83 -0.128** -2.39 
Thailand -0.030 -0.5 -0.020 -0.43 -0.107 -0.94 
Turkey -0.294** -2.44 -0.286** -2.6 -0.151** -2.27 
United 
Kingdom -0.086** -2.71 -0.099*** -3.53 -0.103*** -3.41 
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Number (%) 
of declines 30/31 (96.77%) 28/31 (90.32%) 25/31 (80.65%) 
Number (%) 
of significant 
declines 19/31 (61.29%) 19/31 (61.29%) 14/31 (45.16%) 
 
